STAFFING A FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE
One week from tonight the next President of
the United States will be turning to the arduous tasks that lie ahead -
selecting a Cabinet - and preparing a program for peace.
But whoever our next President may be - whomever
he selects as his Secretary of State - their efforts for a successful foreign
policy, their efforts for peace, will depend in large measure on the men
and women who must carry out that policy. A program for peace can be no
better than those who implement it. Our stature abroad can be no more respected
or influential than those who speak for us. The policies may be decided
at the top - but they are placed and executed here, and accepted or rejected
abroad, at a somewhat lower level.
Speaking in this State last month, Mr. Nixon
showed his inability to grasp this basic fact. His objective was to describe
the new machinery by which he intended to "win the struggle for peace and
freedom." But that machinery turned out to be nothing more than a series
of committees, conferences, and good will tours.
This should not have come as a surprise. In
these last 8 years, confronted with some 75 different problems requiring
action, this administration has promptly responded with some 75 different
committees and conferences. Mr. Nixon has announced a new committee or
conference himself on the average of once a week in this campaign.
But to win the peace - to prevent another
war - and it will not be a war of words - we need more than words, harsh
or soft, more than committees, conferences, and goodwill trips. We need
a stronger America - militarily, economically, scientifically, and educationally.
We need a stronger free world, a stronger attack on world poverty, a stronger
U.N., a stronger U.S. foreign policy - and, above all, a stronger foreign-policy
staff that is dedicated to peace.
I recognize fully the need for judgment and
foresight by the President and his top advisers. High-level committees
and summit conferences can play a useful role. But the hard, tough work
of laying the groundwork for peace must be done by thousands of hands.
It was Clemenceau who said: "War is much too serious a matter to be entrusted
to the generals." And surely, in this nuclear age, peace is much too serious
a matter to be entrusted to either generals or summit conferences.
We can push a button to start the next war
- but there is no push-button magic to bring a just and lasting peace.
To be peace loving is not enough - for the Sermon on the Mount saved its
blessing for the peacemakers. The generation for which I speak has seen
enough of warmongers - let our great role in history be that of peacemakers.
But the harsh facts of the matter are that
in three vital areas we have been ill-staffed and ill-represented in the
struggle for peace - in our disarmament planning, in our diplomatic and
foreign service, and in our technical assistance to underdeveloped nations.
In all three areas, we have failed to realize
that times have changed since World War II. Weapons are more complex, and,
therefore, so is their control. The enemy advances now by nonmilitary methods
- and military methods cannot prevent that advance.
Disarmament planning is one of the most glaring
failures of these last 8 years. There have been a series of opportunities,
conferences, and proposals by other nations including the Russians. But
we have not been ready. The inspection and detection of modern weapons
and their testing requires complex new techniques in dozens of specialized
technologies: seismology, atmospherics, aerial reconnaissance, radar surveillance,
and many others. The research problems are enormous.
But this administration has had fewer than
100 employees working full time in this field - less than one-fifth as
many Government employees as are taking care of cemeteries and memorials
for the U.S. Battle Monuments Commission.
As a result, our disarmament proposals have
lacked continuity and practicality - our delegates to arms-control conferences
have been ill-prepared, ill-instructed, ill-staffed, and constantly changed.
We have never adopted a comprehensive and meaningful position, and we have
too often resorted instead to irresponsible grandstand plays.
I have proposed a national peace agency, an
arms control research institute, to prepare those studies necessary for
a firm and precise policy, to make certain our spokesmen are better prepared
and better staffed at future conferences, to enable us to seize the disarmament
initiative. For I know we can do better.
But I want to turn now to the problems of
our foreign policy staff overseas. Many Americans have marveled at the
selfless example of Dr. Tom Dooley in Laos. Many have shuddered at the
examples in "The Ugly American." Both examples may be found in great numbers
in our oversea missions. But most of our personnel are somewhere in between,
most could be doing a better job, and most must do a better job if we are
to survive the modern techniques of conquest.
For on the other side of the globe, diplomats
skilled in the languages and customs of the nation to whom they are accredited
- teachers, doctors, technicians and experts desperately needed in a dozen
fields by underdeveloped nations - are pouring forth from Moscow to advance
the cause of world communism.
The Lenin Institute for Political Warfare
exports each year hundreds of agents to disrupt free institutions in the
uncommitted world. A friend of mine visiting the Soviet Union last
year met a young Russian couple studying Swahili and African customs at
the Moscow Institute of Languages. They were not language teachers - he
was a sanitation engineer and she was a nurse. And they were being prepared
to live among African nations as missionaries for communism.
Already Asia has more of these Soviet than
American technicians - and Africa may by this time. Russian diplomats are
the first to arrive, the first to offer aid, the only ones represented
by key officials at diplomatic receptions. They know the country, they
speak the language - and in Guinea, Ghana, Laos, and all over the globe,
they are working fast and effectively. Missiles and arms cannot stop them
- neither can American dollars. They can only be countered by Americans
equally skilled and equally dedicated - and if I am elected, I ask you
to help me find those Americans.
The key arm of our foreign policy is our ambassadorial
and Foreign Service. In my travels to every continent, I have often been
impressed with the caliber of men and women in the Foreign Service.
But I have also been depressed by the grounds for selecting the non-career
ambassadors who are placed in charge of these career servants. Many have
been ill-chosen, ill-equipped, and ill-briefed. Campaign contributions
have been regarded as a substitute for experience. Party leadership has
been regarded as a substitute for training. Men who lack compassion for
our own people here at home - for our poor, our oppressed, our minority
groups - have been sent to oversea posts where compassion, as well as anticommunism,
must be reflected in their daily words and deeds. Men who do not even know
how to pronounce the name of the chief of state to whom they are accredited
must match wits with Communist emissaries long trained in the ways and
dialects of that nation. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded
this year about our ambassadors:
There are too many nominees, career and noncareer, who are merely so-so; not had enough to reject, but not really first rate.In 1958, it was reported that our Ambassador to Moscow was the only U.S. Ambassador to a Communist country who spoke the language of the country to which he was assigned. Only two of the nine ambassadors in Arabic-speaking countries spoke Arabic. In 8 of the 12 non-English-speaking NATO countries, our ambassadors lacked a workable knowledge of the main language spoken there. But even our Ambassador in Paris could not negotiate with General De Gaulle in French. "A man who is ignorant of foreign languages," said Goethe, "is ignorant of his own."